Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2-1-2004

Georgia General Assembly Adopts "Manifest Disregard" as a
Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards: How Will Georgia Courts
Treat the New Standard?
John W. Hinchey
Director, Appellate Litigation Clinic King & Spalding

Thomas V. Burch
Director, Appellate Litigation Clinic University of Georgia School of Law, tvburch@uga.edu

Repository Citation
John W. Hinchey and Thomas V. Burch, Georgia General Assembly Adopts "Manifest Disregard" as a
Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards: How Will Georgia Courts Treat the New Standard? Ga. B.J. 10
(2004),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1202

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

rbitration offers attractive alternatives to litigation in terms of speed,
lower costs, flexibility of process and business-oriented decisions.
However, these advantages can come at the price of a legally incorrect decision - a result that is significantly at odds with the judicial process. Over
the last decade, state and federal courts have struggled to find an acceptable bal-

By John W. Hinchey and
Thomas V. Burch

ance between these competing interests of arbitration and litigation, and their
efforts have raised an im_portant question: To what extent should courts respect the
decisions of arbitrators?
Generally, courts may only set aside arbitration awards on the grounds listed in
the Federal Arbitration Act1 or the applicable state arbitration code. However, all
federal circuit courts 2 and a few state courts3 have adopted a non-statutory exception that allows a court to overturn an arbitrator's decision if the arbitrator has
exemplified a "manifest disregard" of the law. 4
The manifest disregard standard for vacating arbitration awards originated from
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swnn, 5 and one court has since
defined it as an arbitrator's "willful inattentiveness to the governing law." 6
However, in the fifty years following Wilko, only two federal courts have vacated
an arbih·ation award based on the manifest disregard standard? This may be attributed to proble1ns associated with distinguishing "manifest disregard" from "ordinary legal error." 8 The Willw Court was the first to make this distinction, but it did
not give explicit guidelines for when or how lower courts should do the same. As a
result, most courts have taken different approaches to, and have reached different
results after, implementing the manifest disregard standard. 9
In 2002, after several years of tentative lower court decisions, the Georgia
Supreme Court, in Progressive Dntn Systems v. Jefferson Holding Corporation, held
that manifest disregard is not a proper ground for vacatur in Georgia. 10 The court
emphasized that Georgia's Arbitration Code does not iinplicitly contain the manifest disregard standard, and that Georgia courts should not liberally interpret the
Code in a vain attem_pt to find it. 11 In 2003, however, the Georgia General
Assembly amended the Georgia Arbitration Code to specifically include manifest
disregard as a ground for vacating arbitration awards. 12 Governor Sonny Perdue
signed the act in June of 2003, effectively nullifying the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision in Progressive Dntn Systems, and thereby making Georgia the first state in
the country to statutorily adopt the manifest disregard standard. 13 Nevertheless,
because the new act does not instruct courts regarding how to apply manifest disregard, it is uncertain whether Georgia courts will adopt a broad or narrow interpretation of the doctrine.

THE

INE

As the time and expenses involved in litigating a case have risen in recent years,
public policy has dictated an increasing emphasis on more efficient alternatives,
including arbitration. Arbitration agreements commit parties to accept the decisions of a neutral arbitrator on questions of fact, contract, and law that may arise
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during the course of a business
relationship. 14 Win or lose, an arbitration agreement is an enforceable
contractual commitment specifically entered into, among other reasons, to avoid the more expensive
option of litigation.15
In the interest of speed and economic efficiency, courts have historically given broad deference to
arbitrators' decisions. Arbitrators
are not required to provide a
record of their rationale,16 and
courts may not review an arbitrator's award solely on its merits,17
This arbitral discretion is not
entirely unfettered, however; arbitrators are still bound to follow the
law.18 Accordingly, judicial review
of arbitration awards must be
stringent enough to enforce arbitrators' compliance with the applicable laws, while respecting the
strong federal policy in favor of
deference to arbitration.19
Courts that allow application of
the manifest disregard standard
generally follow a two-part test in
determining whether to vacate an
award under this standard. First, a
court must look to whether the arbitrator knew the applicable law and
refused to apply it. Second, the court
attempts to determine whether the
law was explicit and clearly applicable to the case.20 Thus, this standard
requires more than a mere error or
misunderstanding of the law.
Instead, the arbih·ator must have
made a conscious decision to ignore
known and. applicable legal principles. 21 As one court explained,
"'[A]s long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope
of his authority,' a court's conviction
that the arbitrator made a serious
mistake or conunitted grievous
error will not fumish a satisfactory
basis for undoing the decision."22
12

Further, determining whether an
arbitrator rnanifestly disregarded
the law can be a very difficult task
because arbitrators do not have to
disclose the reasons behind their
awards. When an arbitrator fails to
explain an award, a reviewing
court can only infer from the record
whether the arbitrator knew about
the governing legal principle but
decided to ignore it. 23 In such a
case, the court must confirm the
arbitration award even if the
ground for the decision is based on
error of fact or law.24
As one can see, courts that allow
for the vacatur of an award based
on an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law have set an extremely high standard for review.
Because of the strong public policy
that exists in favor of arbitration,
courts give great deference to arbitrators' decisions, and the judicial
inquiry 1mder the manifest disregard standard is quite limited.25

RATIONALE
FOR APPLYING,
OR REFUSING
TO APPLYu
THE MANIFEST
DISREGARD
STANDARD
Courts evaluating whether to
adopt the manifest disregard standard often reach different outcomes because of conflicting
philosophies regarding two primary issues. First, courts disagree
over the amount of deference they
shoul_d grant to arbitrators' decisions. 26 Giving greater deference to
the arbitrator will result in a more
efficient judicial system. However,
subjecting the arbitrators' decisions
to higher scrutiny will encourage

arbitrators to comply with the
requirements of the law.
Second, courts hold differing
opinions on their ability to vacate
arbih·ation awards on grounds that
are not specifically listed in the
applicable arbitration acts. Some
state courts have refused to adopt
the manifest disregard standard
because it is not mentioned in their
respective state laws on arbitration.27 All of the federal circuits,
however, have adopted the standard as a ground for vacating arbitration awards, 28 either accepting
that rnanifest disregard is an official creation of the judiciary,29 or
finding that manifest disregard is
implicit in the language of the
Federal Arbitration Act.30

THE 11TH
CIRCUIT'S
APPLICATION Of
THE MANIFEST
DISREGARD
STANDARD
The 11th Circuit adopted two
other non-statutory grounds for
vacating arbitration awards before it
accepted manifest disregard, and it
only accepted manifest disregard
when faced with a case where one
party "explicitly urged [the arbitrator] to disregard the law."31 In

Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers,
the court vacated an arbitration
award because Shearson' s attorney
convinced the arbitrator to rule in
favor of his client by saying: "I
know, as I have served many times
as an arbitrator, that you as an arbitrator are not .. . strictly bound by
case law and precedent. You have
the ability to do what is right, what
is fair and proper, and that's what
Shearson is asking you to do."32 The
Georgia Bar Journal

For nearly 10 years, the Georgia Supreme
Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have
reached differing opinions regarding the applicability of the manifest disregard standard.
11th Circuit analyzed the appropriateness of overturning an arbih·ation
award under such circumstances
and "conclude[d] that a manifest
disregard for the law ... can constitute grounds to vacate an arbih·ation
decision." 33 Nevertheless, the 11th
Circuit emphasized the narrow
scope of the rnanifest disregard standard and noted that it would not
reverse arbitrators' decisions for
mere errors or misinterpretations of
applicable legal principles.34 The
court only applied the standard in
Montes because "the arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the law."35
The most interesting aspect of
Montes, however, is that in order to
find that the arbitrators manifestly
disregarded the law, the 11th
Circuit had to presume that the
arbitrators actually followed the
advice of Shearson's counsel. 36
Thus, the court found manifest
disregard" without any type of
admission by the arbitrators that
they consciously ignored the law.37
JI

Once the court determined that the
arbitration decision was legally
incorrect, the statements of
Shearson' s counsel created a presumption that the arbitrators
knowingly disregarded applicable
legal principles. Because there was
no evidence in the record to refute
this presumption, the court vacated
the arbitration award.38
A potential problem with the
11th Circuit's presumption is that,
if consh·ued broadly, it could be
abused by the courts. 39 Under such
14

a standard, courts could find that
virtually any improper evidence
creates a presumption of arbitral
wrongdoing. If there is no evidence
in the record to refute the presumption once it arises (which will usually be the case because arbitrators
normally do not provide written
opinions), the court could freely
vacate the award. However, the
Montes court em.phasized that manifest disregard is a narrow ground
for vacatur and only adopted the
standard where the record showed
evidence that one party explicitly
urged the arbitrator to ignore the
law.40 Therefore, because such factual circumstances are rare, the likelihood of abuse in the 11th Circuit
(i.e., applying Montes without legitimate evidence of arbitral wrongdoing) should be minimal.41

GEORGIA'S
TREATMENT Of
THE MANIFEST
DISREGARD
STANDARD
For nearly 10 years, the Georgia
Supren1e Court and the Georgia
Court of Appeals have reached differing opinions regarding the
applicability of the manifest disregard standard. In 1994, the Georgia
Court of Appeals accepted the
principle that an arbitrator's decision must be upheld unless it is
completely irrational or it constitutes a manifest disregard of the
law."42 Two years later, however,
JI

the Georgia Supreme Court stated
that courts should strictly construe
the Georgia Arbitration Code 43
and that the four statutory
grounds listed under Section 9-913(b) of the Code were the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbih·ation award. 44 Accordingly, the
Court aimounced that a court may
only vacate an arbitration award if
the rights of a party were prejudiced by: (1) corruption, fraud, or
misconduct, (2) a partial arbitrator,
(3) an arbitrator's overstepping his
authority, or (4) a court's failure to
follow procedure.45
In 2002, the Georgia Supre1ne
Court issued another opinion on
the validity of n1.anifest disregard
as a ground for vacatur. Progressive

Dntn Systems v. Jefferson Randolph
Corp. involved an arbitrator's decision to award future licensing fees
as damages for a breach of contract.
Even though the arbitrator recognized that future licensing fees
were an unenforceable penalty, he
awarded them anyway. 46 The
Georgia Court of Appeals vacated
the award by saying that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law, and it held that Section 9-913(b)(3) of the Georgia Arbitration
Code implicitly contained manifest
disregard as a ground for
vacatur.47 However, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals' decision, emphasizing
that manifest disregard is not
implicit within Section 9-9-13(6)(3),
which section only allows courts to
overturn arbitration awards when
arbitrators overstep their authority .48 The Georgia Supreme Court
noted that " [o]verstepping the
arbitrator's authority ... only cmnes
into play when an arbitrator determines matters beyond the scope of
the case," and does not include the
concept of manifest disregard.49
Georgia Bar Journal

.....
Despite the Georgia Supreme
Court's efforts to exclude manifest
disregard as a ground for vacating
arbitrntion awards, the standard
now exists in the state because of
recent actions taken by the
Georgia General Assembly. In
January 2003, a bill was introduced in the Georgia House of
Representatives to specifically
include manifest disregard as one
of the grounds for vacatur contained in Section 9-9-13(b).
Although that bill later died in the
Senate,50 a second version successfully passed through both houses
in April 2003. The governor then
signed the bill into law on June 4,
2003,5 1 making Georgia the first
state to legislatively adopt the
manifest disregard standard.
Therefore, effective July 1, 2003,
"manifest disregard" is a valid
ground for vacating arbitration
awards in Georgia.
Because the General Assembly
has enacted manifest disregard as
part of Georgia's Arbitration
Code, Georgia courts must now
decide how to apply the standard
to the vacatur of arbitration
awards. The language of the
amendment to the Georgia
Arbitration Code does not give
courts any instruction on how to
do so. The Code simply states
that courts should overturn arbitration awards if the rights of a
party were prejudiced by "[t]he
arbitrator's manifest disregard of
the law."5 2 Therefore, Georgia
courts are free to interpret the
breadth of the new manifest disregard standard.

WHAT
Considering the issues raised in
state and federal courts over how
to apply manifest disregard as a
ground for vacatur, no clear
16

guidelines exist for how Georgia
courts should treat the General
Assembly's recent arnendment to
the Arbitration Code. One might
argue that if the General
Assembly had wanted to constrain arbitrators to be strictly
bound by applicable law, the
amendment could have been
much more intentional. For example, the General Assembly could
have enacted a specific ground for
vacatur that the arbitrators "failed
or refused to follow applicable
law." Instead, the legislature
incorporated into the General
Arbitration Code a checkered
judicial doctrine most often interpreted by other state and federal
courts to have a limited reach.53
Indeed, previous 11th Circuit and
Georgia Court of Appeals decisions dealing with the issue of
manifest disregard have attempted to place severe limitations on a
court's authority to review the
merits of an arbitrator's decision,
and these limitations may well be
instructive as to how Georgia
courts will treat the standard.
If Georgia courts continue with
this trend and treat the manifest
disregard standard as they have in
the past, the scope of the manifest
disregard doctrine in Georgia will
be very limited.
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Assistant Attorney General in
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judicial system.

Thomas Burch is an
associate at King &
Spalding LLP. He
earned his J.D. from
Florida State University.

Endnotes
1. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §10 (2000). The FAA only
includes the following as grounds
for vacatur: fraud or corruption,
partiality of the arbitrator, failure
to follow applicable procedures,
and overstepping the arbitrator's
authority. 9 U.S.C. § lO(a) (2000).
The federal circuits are split on
whether parties may contractually
expand judicial review under the
FAA. See generally Victoria L. C.
Holstein, Co-opting the Federal

Judician;: Contractual Expansion of
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards,
12 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 276 (2001).
2. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914
F.2d 6, 9 n5 (1st Cir. 1990);
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148
F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998); United
Transp. Union Local 1589 v.
Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d
376,380 (3d Cir. 1995); Remmey v.
Paine Webber, Inc. 32 F.3d 143, 149
(4th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Cigna
Financial Advisors, 197 F.3d 752,
758-59 (5th Cir. 1999); M & C Corp.
v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG,
87 F.3d 844, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1996);
Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v.
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1992); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d
883 (8th Cir. 1993); Michigan Mut.
Ins. v. Unigard Sec. Ins., 44 F.3d
826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995); ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45
F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1995);
Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Brothers, 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62
(11th Cir. 1997); Sargent v. Paine
Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. 882
F.2d 529, 532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
3. See Swentor v. Swentor, 520 S.E.2d
330, 338 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("The
court may vacate the award only
upon the establishment of one of
the grounds set forth in section 1548-130, or the rarely applied nonstatutory ground of 'manifest disregard or perverse misconstruction
of the law."'); Geissler v. Sanem,
949 P.2d 234, 237-38 (Mont. 1997)
(accepting manifest disregard as a
well reasoned approach to vacat-
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6.
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ing arbitration awards); Wichinsky
v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727,731 (Nev.
1993) ("When an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, a reviewing court may vacate an arbih·ation
award"); Garrity v. McCaskey, 612
A.2d 742, 746-47 (Com1. 1992)
(accepting manifest disregard as a
ground for vacatur); Board of
Educ. v. Prince George's County
Educator's Ass'n, 522 A.2d 931,
938-41 (Md. 1987) (passing on the
question of whether manifest disregard is a standard for vacatur
under statutory law but stating
that "[u]nder Maryland conunon
law standards for reviewing arbitration awards, however, we hold
that an award is subject to being
vacated for a 'palpable mistake of
law or fact ... apparent on the face
of the award' or for a 'mistake so
gross as to work manifest injustice."').
1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION§ 33.08 (2003)
[hereinafter DOMKE].
346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) overruled on
other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/ American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
see also First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942
(1995) (approving of the manifest
disregard standard in Wilko).
ARW Exploration Corp. v.
Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th
Cir. 1995).
DOMKE, supra note 4, at § 33.08;
see also 4 IAN R. MACNEIL, ET
AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW §40.7.1 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter MACNEIL ET AL.] ("It is
nearly impossible to find FAA
arbitration decisions where application of the doctrine has resulted
in upsetting of an award.").
See Michael P. O'Mullan, Note,
Seeking Consistency in Judicial
Review of Secit rities Arbitration: An
Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of
the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1121, 1127 (1995).
Compare Advest Inc. v. McCarthy,
914 F. 2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the First Circuit will
enforce the manifest disregard
standard where it is clear that the
arbitrator knew the applicable law
and ignored it) with Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,
204 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating an
arbitration award based on the
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arbitrator's manifest disregard of
the law and facts).
568 S.E.2d 474,475 (Ga. 2002).
Id. at 475.
See GA. HB 792 (2003).
GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR
LIST, available at
http:/ /www.legis.state.ga.us/legis
/2003_04/leg/ govsign.html (last
visited June 23, 2003).
Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for
Vacatur of Co111111ercial Arbitration
Awards, 30 GA L. REV. 731, 740
(1996).
Id. at 741.
See Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.,
469 F.2d 1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972)
(stating that forcing arbitrators to
explain their award even when
grounds for it can be gleaned from
the record will unjustifiably diminish whatever efficiency the process
achieves).
See Montes v. Shearson Lelunan
Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir.
1997) (" An arbitration board that
incorrectly interprets the law has
not manifestly disregarded it. It
has simply made a legal mistake.
To manifestly disregard the law,
one must be conscious of the law
and deliberately ignore it.").
See id. at 1459-60 ("By agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.").
See Williams v. Cigna Financial
Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 761 (5th
Cir. 1999); MACNEIL ET AL., supra
note 7, at§ 40.7.2.1.
DOMKE, supra note 4, at§ 33.08.
Id. at § 33.08; see also MACNEIL ET
AL., supra note 7, at § 40.7.2.1
(expounding on the principles of
the manifest disregard standard).
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d
6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United
Paper Workers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
See DOMKE, supra note 4, at §
33.08.
Id.; but see Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,204 (2d
Cir. 1998) (vacating an arbitration
award where the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the evidence).
See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note
7, at§ 40.7.2.1.

26. See id. at§ 40.7.2.5 (discussing the
degree to which courts should
allow arbitrators to supersede
applicable law with their own
ideas of justice).
27. See, e.g., Warbington Const., Inc. v.
Franklin Landmark LLC, 66
S.W.3d 853, 859 (Te1m. Ct. App.
2001) (refusing to adopt manifest
disregard as a basis for vacating
arbih·ation awards).
28. See Williams v. Cigna Financial
Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 759 (5th
Cir. 1999) (" Accordingly, each of
the other numbered federal circuit
courts and the D.C. Circuit have
recognized manifest disregard of
the law as either an implicit or
nonstatutory ground for vacatur
under the FAA"). See also cases
cited supra note 2.
29. See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy,
914 F.2d 6, 9 n5 (1st Cir. 1990)
("The lane of review that has
opened out of this [manifest disregard] language is a judicially created one, not to be found in 9 U.S.C.
§ 10.").
30. See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin
Belu- GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d
844, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1996)
(" Although not mentioned in the
statute itself, an award may be
vacated under the Federal
Arbitration Act if the arbitrator
exhibits a manifest disregard of the
law."); Progressive Data Systems
v. Jefferson Randolph Corp., 568
S.E.2d 474,475 (Ga. 2002) (Carley,
J., dissenting) ("I strongly believe
that the grounds set forth in that
statute implicitly incorporate the
concept of 'manifest disregard of
the law.' ").
31. Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Brothers, 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (11th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the
11th Circuit previously adopted
"arbitrary and capricious," and
"conh·ary to public policy" as
grounds for vacating an arbitration
award before accepting the manifest disregard standard).
32. Id. at 1459.
33. Id. at 1461-62.
34. Id. at 1460-62.
35. Id. at 1462.
36. Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the
"Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order
to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP.
RESOL. 117, 129 (1998) [hereinafter
Hayford II].
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37. Id.
38. See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461-64.
39. See Hayford II, supra note 36, at
129-31 (discussing a court's ability
to "bootstrap" its way to finding
manifest disregard of the law).
40. See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1460-62.
41. But see Hayford II, supra note 36, at
128-32 (arguing that the 11th
Circuit's decision in Montes is a
broad application of the manifest
disregard standard and that it will
give courts too much discretion in
reviewing arbitration awards).
42. Amerispec Franchise v. Cross, 452
S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(citation omitted).
43. GA. CODE ANN.§ 9-9-1 et seq.
(2002).

44. Greene v. Hundley, 468 S.E.2d 350,
352 (Ga. 1996); see also Progressive
Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson
Randolph Corp., 568 S.E.2d 474,
475 (Ga. 2002) (holding that
Georgia courts caiu1ot vacate an
arbitrator's award based on maiufest disregard of the law).
45. See Greene, 468 S.E.2d at 352 (citing
GA. CODE ANN.§ 9-9-13(b)(l)-(4)
(2002)).
46. See Progressive Data Systems, 568
S.E.2d at 474.
47. Jefferson Randolph Corp. v.
Progressive Data Systems, 553
S.E.2d 304, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
rev'd by Progressive Data Systems,
Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp.,
568 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 2002).
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48. Progressive Data Systems, 568 S.E.2d
at 475.
49. Id.
50. See GA. HB 91 (2003).
51. See GA. HB 792 (2003); GEORGIA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SIGNED
BY THE GOVERNOR LIST, avail-

able at
http:/ /www.legis.state.ga.us/legis
/2003_04/leg/ govsign.html (last
visited June 23, 2003).
52. See GA. HB 792 (2003).
53. Most courts admit that manifest
disregard is a limited ground for
vacatur. Some, however, have
adopted a very broad interpretation.
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